The proper functioning of a hospital computer system is an arduous work for managers and staff. However, inconsistent policies are frequent and can produce enormous problems, such as stolen information, frequent failures, and loss of the entire or part of the hospital data. This paper presents a new method named EMRlog for computer security systems in hospitals. EMRlog is focused on two kinds o...

Security is a key issue for distributed systems/applications with code mobility, like, e.g., e-commerce and on-line bank transactions. In a scenario with code mobility, traditional solutions based on cryptography cannot deal with all security issues and additional mechanisms are necessary. In this paper, we present a flexible and expressive type system for security for a calculus of distributed...

Are computing systems trustworthy? To answer this, we need to know three things: what the systems are supposed to do, what they are not supposed to do, and what they actually do. All three are problematic. There is no expressive, practical way to specify what systems must do and must not do. And if we had a specification, it would likely be infeasible to show that existing computing systems sat...

Monitoring is a powerful security policy enforcement paradigm that allows the execution of a potentially malicious software by observing and transforming it, thus ensuring its compliance with a user-defined security policy. Yet some restrictions must be imposed on the monitor’s ability to transform sequences, so that key elements of the execution’s semantics are preserved. An approximation of t...

This paper contributes to the current discussion on multipolicy systems: Systems that support a multitude of independent security domains in which an individual security policy is enforced on the applications. In multipolicy systems, the interoperability between diierent security domains constitutes a major problem. While security policies are capable of controlling the applications within thei...

Despite the fact that the formulation and use of information security policies are commonly practiced and that organizations devote significant resources to information security management, it is commonplace that the application of a security policy fails to accomplish its goals. For example, policies may be issued but not reviewed to include new regulatory requirements or business process chan...

INTER-TRUST is a framework for the specification, negotiation, deployment and dynamic adaptation of interoperable security policies, in the context of pervasive systems where devices are constantly exchanging critical information through the network. The dynamic adaptation of the security policies at runtime is addressed using AspectOriented Programming (AOP) that allows enforcing security requ...

State-of-the-art security mechanisms are often enforced in isolation from each other, which limits the kinds of policies that can be enforced in distributed and heterogeneous settings. More specifically, it is hard to enforce application-level policies that affect, or use information from multiple distributed components. This paper proposes the concept of a Security Service Bus (SSB), which is ...

Security policies are one of the most fundamental elements of computer security. Their design has to cope with composition of components in security systems and interactions between them. Consequently, a modular approach for specification and verification of security policies is necessary and the composition of modules must consistently ensure fundamental properties of security policies, in a r...

Security policies are widely used across the IT industry in order to secure environments. Firewalls, routers, enterprise application or even operating systems like Windows and Unix are all using security policies to some extent in order to secure certain components. In order to automate enforcement of security policies, security policy languages have been introduced. Security policy languages t...