For the game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple common agents discussed by Prat and Rustichini (2003), we construct a general set of equilibrium transfers which implement any efficient outcome as a weakly truthful equilibrium, and the subset of such equilibria that are Pareto optimal for the principals. We provide conditions under which the general set completely char...

This paper studies an incentive rationale for the use of group lending as a method of financing liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs. The joint liability feature associated with group lending lowers the liquidity risk of default but creates a free-riding problem. In the static setting, the free-riding problem dominates the liquidity risk effect under a plausible condition, thus making group lend...

Social network formation models are often compared by their network structures, which satisfy specific equilibrium or welfare properties. Here, we concentrate on welfare criteria and define properties of utility function which are causal for certain network structures. We hope the identification of different properties of utility function will enhance the understanding of the relationship of di...

This study tests the importance of Ricardian technology differences for international trade. The empirical analysis has three comparative advantages: including emerging and advanced economies, isolating panel variation regarding the link between productivity and exports, and exploiting heterogeneous technology diffusion from immigrant communities in the United States for identification. The lat...

In this paper, we examine whether frictions created by differences in firm boundaries affect the speed with which firms adopt new Information Technology. Using a rich dataset on organizational characteristics and Internet investment by over 100 firms in the insurance industry, we show that vertical integration in distribution has a significant impact on the speed with which insurers adopt consu...

Are minorities more vulnerable to opportunism? We find that individuals from a minority group face greater danger of being cheated by an opportunistic firm because trade with the group is less frequent and the value of a reputation for fairness toward the group is correspondingly smaller. If the majority is sufficiently large it can only lose from a solidarity strategy of punishing opportunism ...

This paper studies the strategic interaction between a foreign direct investor and a host country. We analyze how the investor can use his control rights to protect his investment if he faces the risk of “creeping expropriation” once his investment is sunk. It is shown that this hold-up problem may cause underinvestment if the bargaining position of the investor is too weak and overinvestment i...

Introduction 1. How to Solve the Deformation Equation 2. Deformations of Singularities 3. Smoothing Components of Curves 4. The Versal Deformation of L14 5. Remarks References Acknowledgement Electronic Availability In recent years I have computed versal deformations of various singularities, partly by hand, but mostly with the program Macaulay. I explain here how to do these computations. As a...

I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the established firm’s incentive to enter one of its partner’s markets. I show that equity can eliminate the entry...

The three-dimensional structures of the alpha-sarcin ribotoxin and its delta(7-22) deletion mutant, both complexed with a 20-mer oligonucleotide mimicking the sarcin/ricin loop (SRL) of the ribosome, have been docked into the structure of the Halobacterium marismortui ribosome by fitting the nucleotide atomic coordinates into those of the ribosomal SRL. This study has revealed that two regions ...