Particularly socially influential individuals are present in many groups [1-8], but it is unclear whether their emergence is determined by their social influence versus the social susceptibility of others [9]. The social spider Stegodyphus dumicola shows regional variation in apparent leader-follower dynamics. We use this variation to evaluate the relative contributions of leader social influen...

In this paper, there are two competitors in a planar market. The first competitor, called, the leader, opens p new facilities. After that, the second competitor, the follower, reacts to the leader’s action and opens r new facilities. The leader and the follower have got some facilities in advance in this market. The optimal locations for leader and follower are chosen among predefined candidate...

Phenotypic heterogeneity is widely observed in cancer cell populations. Here, to probe this heterogeneity, we developed an image-guided genomics technique termed spatiotemporal genomic and cellular analysis (SaGA) that allows for precise selection and amplification of living and rare cells. SaGA was used on collectively invading 3D cancer cell packs to create purified leader and follower cell l...

We consider the problem of having a group of nonholonomic mobile robots equipped with omnidirectional cameras maintain a desired leader-follower formation. Our approach is to translate the formation control problem from the configuration space into a separate visual servoing task for each follower. We derive the equations of motion of the leader in the image plane of the follower and propose tw...

This paper investigates the ability of the largest producer in an electricity market to manipulate both the electricity and emission allowances markets to its advantage. A Stackelberg game to analyze this situation is constructed in which the largest firm plays the role of the leader, while the medium-sized firms are treated as Cournot followers with price-taking fringes that behave competitive...

We consider a supply chain involving one supplier and one retailer in which a revenuesharing contract is adopted. Under this contract, the retailer can obtain the product from the supplier at a discounted price. As a compensation, the retailer must share his revenue with the supplier at a certain revenue-sharing rate, say r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1), where r represents the portion of the revenue to be kept b...

The problem of coordinated control of a leader-follower system is solved using a virtual vehicle approach to alleviate information requirements on the leader. The virtual vehicle stabilizes to a shifted reference position/heading defined by the leader, and provides a reference velocity for the synchronization control law of the follower. Only position/heading measurements are available from the...

This paper studies the leader-follower formation control for multiple quadrotors. Two controllers are used. The first one is a proportional derivative controller used to ensure the tracking of the leader to the desired trajectory, while the second is based on fuzzy logic in order to achieve the desired formation in ! − ! plane with equal height (!) for all follower quadrotors. In order to ensur...

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines payoff for both players. The chooses signals maximize its own utility function while aims ascertain value source is privately known sender. It well such sender–receiver games admit vast number equilibria and not all from...

We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the informed contribute prior to the uninformed. Sequential moves result in a larger provision of the public goo...