We use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in lending markets. Introduction of loan market competition is shown to reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Hence, there need not be a tradeo€ between lending market competi...

This paper studies the impact of geographic banking deregulation on the effectiveness of monetary policy. State-level removal of restrictions on interstate banking strengthened the effect of monetary policy on bank lending. This effect was driven by small banks affiliated with bank holding companies. Following interstate deregulation affiliated banks reallocate assets towards securities and awa...

In this paper we re–examine banks’ lending behavior taking into account changes in the stance of monetary policy in conjunction with changes in financial sector uncertainty. Using a very large data set covering all banks in the US between 1979–2000, we show that financial sector uncertainty plays an important role in banks’ lending decisions: for a given size classification, less liquid banks (...

Lending rates are more likely to experience big jumps rather than big drops. I compare this asymmetry across countries. First, I document that lending rates are more asymmetric in economies with poor financial systems. Second, I explain this finding by introducing agency costs into a model with endogenous flow of information about the aggregate state of the economy. High monitoring costs magnif...

More than half of the assets in China’s banking system are accounted for by four huge state-owned commercial banks. This paper examines the changing factors influencing these banks’ lending behavior over the post-1994 period on a province-by-province basis. Determinants include the concentration of state-owned enterprises, the level of provincial prosperity, deposit levels, and macroeconomic co...

We assess social influence on borrowers’ default decisions in a peer-to-peer lending market. Our analysis suggests that online borrowers are significantly influenced by defaults in their social networks. A friend’s default decision more than doubles a user’s default rate. We also find that not all friends have equal influences. The social influence is highly significant among online friends mad...