We initiate the study of heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. mainly focus on fundamental case where a set agents are positioned in line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input positions agents, chooses to locate single based this information. mechanisms that aim maximize social welfare (the total utility d...

We consider a new setting of facility location games with ordinal preferences. In such setting, we have set agents and facilities. Each agent is located on line has an preference over the Our goal to design strategyproof mechanisms that elicit truthful information (preferences and/or locations) from locate facilities minimize both maximum total cost objectives as well maximize minimum utility o...

The study of the facility location problem in the presence of self-interested agents has recently emerged as the benchmark problem in the research on mechanism design without money. In the setting studied in the literature so far, agents are single-parameter in that their type is a single number encoding their position on a real line. We here initiate a more realistic model for several real-lif...