A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie in the first stage. If the demands add up to more than one, both players, in the second stage, simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the other’s offer. While both parties sticking to their offers leads to an impasse, accepting a lower share than the or...

Results of ultimatum bargaining experiments show a persistence of behavior that deviates from Nash equilibrium predictions. In addition to strategic considerations, many have attributed these results to a taste for fairness on the part of subjects. We investigate this concept by introducing an outside option for proposers in the game. We find that the outcome of the experiment varies systematic...

In order to analyze bargaining in pure exchange and public good economies when the agents are not informed about their opponents’ payoffs, we embed each bargaining problem into a noncooperative game of misrepresentation. In pure exchange (public good) economies with an arbitrary number of agents whose true utilities satisfy a mild assumption, the set of allocations obtained at the linear-strate...

Evolutionary accounts of morality consider behavior in rather simple scenarios. work on fairness focuses the division a windfall and, importantly, assumes that positions those involved are entirely symmetric. I more complicated strategic settings and find there is strong tendency for evolution to produce divisions consistent with so-called Nash bargaining solution. also uncover evolutionary imp...

This paper analyzes three-party negotiations in the presence of externalities, deriving a close form solution for the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a standard non-cooperative bargaining model. Players’ values are monotonically increasing (or decreasing) in the amount of negative (or positive) externalities that they impose on others. Moreover, players’ values are continuous and...

In this paper we study the support sizes of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) in random evolutionary games. We prove that, when the elements of the payoff matrix behave either as uniform, or normally distributed independent random variables, almost all ESS have support sizes o(n), where n is the number of possible types for a player. Our arguments are based exclusively on the severity of a s...

The problem of mapping tasks onto a computational grid with the aim to minimize the power consumption and the makespan subject to the constraints of deadlines and architectural requirements is considered in this paper. To solve this problem, we propose a solution from cooperative game theory based on the concept of Nash Bargaining Solution. The proposed game theoretical technique is compared ag...

Microeconomics offer a far developed theory on the subject of rational choice. This theory is applied to a multi-agent system, which has been modeled in order to establish schedules for operating theatres in general hospitals. A concept based on conjoint analysis is introduced in order to measure preferences of involved individuals and to establish corresponding individual utility functions. Ag...