We study when two-member household choice behavior is compatible with Pareto optimality. We ask when an external observer of household choices, who does not know the individuals’ preferences, can rationalize the choices as being Pareto-optimal. Our main contribution is to reduce the problem of rationalization to a graph-coloring problem. As a result, we obtain simple tests for Pareto optimal ch...

We consider the notion of Pareto optimality under the assumption that only the pairwise majority relation is known and show that the set of necessarily Pareto optimal alternatives coincides with the McKelvey uncovered set. As a consequence, the McKelvey uncovered set constitutes the coarsest Pareto optimal majoritarian social choice function. Moreover, every majority relation is induced by a pr...

We study hedonic coalition formation games that consist of a finite set agents and list agents’ preferences such each agent’s depend only on the members her coalition. An outcome game is partition (i.e., structure) agents. existence partitions are both internally stable Pareto optimal. construct an algorithm terminates for given also show if consists singleton coalitions then it core contains g...

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the weak Pareto optimality for multiobjective pseudoconvex problem. In fact, it is a first order optimality characterization that generalize the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker condition. Moreover, this work is an extension of the single-objective case [6] to the multiobjective one with pseudoconvex continuous functions. Mathematics Subject Classification: 46N10,...