The objects for sale in most auctions display both private and common value characteristics. This salient feature of many real-world auctions has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior. This paper reports such an analysis in the context of a stylized model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show...

We consider a single-item private values auction setting with endogenous costly entry. We demonstrate that for symmetric bidders and entry costs that are an arbitrary linear function of value, a unique symmetric Bayes-Nash “cutoff equilibrium” (where only agents with value above some threshold enter) obtains under the Vickrey auction and also a broader class of revenue-redistributing auctions. ...

We study indirect mechanisms in a setting where both objects and privatelyinformed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. The seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem, and must elicit the private information of the dynamic population of buyers in order to achieve her desired outcome—either an efficient or a revenuemaximizing allocation. We propose a simple indirect mechan...

The railway industry offers similar revenue management opportunities to those found in the airline industry. The railway industry caters for the delivery and management of cargo as well as the transport of passengers. Unlike the airline industry, the railway industry has seen relatively little attention to revenue management problems. We provide an overview of the published literature for both ...

Collusion between suppliers in reverse auctions may damage buyers’ benifits and then lower efficiency of resource allocation. Under first-price sealed-bid reverse auction mechanism, suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategy and buyers' revenue loss was analyzed considering collusion. Then some general conclusions were given: suppliers' bidding strategy is relevant to some factors such as valuatio...

This paper studies revenue-sharing contracts in distribution chains in the presence of win-win conditions. Revenue-sharing contracts are a mechanism to coordinate the firms in a distribution chain. Under these contracts the retailer shares its revenue with the supplier in exchange for a lower wholesale price. The win-win conditions are natural conditions requiring that the profit of any firm ma...