Providing security in low-cost RFID tags is a challenging task because tags are highly resource constrained and cannot support strong cryptography. Special lightweight algorithms and protocols need to be designed that take into account the limitations of the tags. In this paper, we propose a set of extremely lightweight tag authentication protocols. We also provide an analysis of the proposed p...

The HB problem first introduced by Blum and Hopper has been the basis for extremely lightweight authentication protocols for RFID tags [18, 19]. In this paper we introduce a variant of this problem which we call the strong HB problem. We analyze the strong HB problem and give some arguments that support its hardness. We then use the strong HB assumption in two applications of independent intere...

In RFID security(Gildas), few mechanisms focus on data protection of the tags, message interception over the air channel, and eavesdropping within the interrogation zone of the RFID reader(Sarma et al.a)(Weis et al.). Among these issues, we will discuss two aspects on the risks posed to the passive party by RFID , which have so far been dominated by the topics of data protection associated with...

RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) is recently becoming popular, promising and widespread. In contrast, RFID tags can bring about traceability that causes user privacy and reduces scalability of RFID. Guaranteeing untraceability and scalability at the same time is so critical in order to deploy RFID widely since user privacy should be guaranteed. A large number of RFID protocols were designe...

We identify privacy, security and performance requirements for RFID protocols, as well as additional functional requirements such as tag ownership transfer. Many previously proposed protocols suffer from scalability issues because they require a linear search to identify or authenticate a tag. In support of scalability, some RFID protocols, however, only require constant time for tag identifica...

In this work, we present a practical passive attack on SASI, an ultra-lightweight mutual authentication protocol for RFID. This attack can be used to reveal with overwhelming probability the secret ID of the prover by eavesdropping about 2 authentications. The result dismantles SASI and, more generally, provides a new approach that threatens ultra-lightweight authentication protocols.

Tag cost and privacy of RFID technology are two main factors that determine whether it will be applied to Internet of Things on a large scale. Recently, RFID industry and research community have focused on RFID authentication protocols with provable privacy and low tag cost. In this paper, we propose an RFID security protocol that achieves all security requirements based on a hash function and ...

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems are vulnerable to relay attacks (i.e., mafia, terrorist and distance frauds) when they are used for authentication purposes. Distance bounding protocols are particularly designed as a countermeasure against these attacks. These protocols aim to ensure that the tags are in a distant area by measuring the round-trip delays during a rapid challenge-res...

One of the main challenges in RFIDs is the design of privacypreserving authentication protocols. Indeed, such protocols should not only allow legitimate readers to authenticate tags but also protect these latter from privacy-violating attacks, ensuring their anonymity and untraceability: an adversary should not be able to get any information that would reveal the identity of a tag or would be u...

Passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag has been used in many applications. While the RFID market is expected to grow, concerns about security and privacy of the RFID tag should be overcome for the future use. To overcome these issues, privacy-preserving authentication protocols based on cryptographic algorithms have been designed. However, to the best of our knowledge, evaluation of ...