In many auction problems, we consider a selfinterested seller who is allocating item(s) to bidders in exchange for payments. The highly celebrated VCG mechanism provides an auction mechanism in this case that is efficient, strategy-proof, and ex post individually rational (IR). If the seller’s goal is to maximize revenue, alternative mechanisms include the Myerson optimal auction, which maximiz...

This paper analyzes the e¤ects of buyer and seller risk aversion in …rst and secondprice auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller’s optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the …rst-p...

This paper analyzes the e¤ects of buyer and seller risk aversion in …rst and secondprice auctions. The setting is the classic one of symmetric and independent private values, with ex ante homogeneous bidders. However, the seller is able to optimally set the reserve price. In both auctions the seller’s optimal reserve price is shown to decrease in his own risk aversion, and more so in the …rst-p...

This article explores the development of sales tax on e-business. It points out that the problem was rooted in the fact that the seller is required to collect and remit the tax to the buyer’s state government. If the seller and the buyer do not reside in the same state, the buyer’s state government has no jurisdiction over the seller, unless there is a “physical presence” of the seller in the b...

In this paper we study dynamic strategic bargaining in business-to-business markets wherein a seller and a buyer possess symmetric information and negotiate over the price of a product for which the seller has a limited capacity. Motivated by the microprocessor market, our model offers an explanation for the occasional observations of delayed price agreement in this market, which cannot be expl...

The paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers. Buyers search sequentially for sellers, but do not meet every sellers with the same probability. Specifically, a fraction of the buyers’ meetings lead to one particular large seller, while the remaining meetings lead to one of a continuum of small sellers. In this environment, the ...

Multi Attributes Procurement Auction is a well known solution for negotiation between sellers and buyers. Seller wants to sell the product with more prices while buyer wants to buy the product with fewer prices. This problem has been analyzed by game theory approach and one optimal solution is achieved for the seller and the buyer with this assumption that the seller knows the exact value of th...

We study a dynamic game between a seller, a buyer (or "activist"), and a regulator. The seller decides whether to produce in a pro…t-maximizing or socially responsible way ("self-regulate"). The buyer, bene…tting from such self-regulation, decides whether to buy or not (i.e., initiate/end the "boycott"). The regulator can directly regulate production, although in a clumsy/costly way. The equili...