Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker wi...

Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept prescribing for a player an optimal strategy to commit to, assuming the opponent knows this commitment and plays the best response. Although this solution concept is a cornerstone of many security applications, the existing works typically do not consider situations where the players can observe and react to the actions of the opponent during the co...

It is sometimes the case that one solution concept in game theory is equivalent to applying another solution concept to a modified version of the game. In such cases, does it make sense to think of the former as a truly separate solution concept, or should we entirely subordinate it to the latter? The answer probably depends on the particular circumstances, and indeed the literature takes diffe...

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group decisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets we find no significant differences in...

Cooperative advertising, which usually occurs in a vertical supply chain, is typically a cost sharing and promotion mechanism for the manufacturer to affect retail performance. Research in the literature, reference price is usually in his mind and plays a determinant role. Taking into account the impact of advertising on the reference price, this paper proposes a dynamic cooperative advertising...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

This work consider the problem of flow control using incentive strategy in Stackelberg game theory. The network model employed here is that users route their flows from a common source to a common destination node, each of them trying to optimize its individual performance objective. First, the existing Stackelberg routing strategy is briefly introduced. And then, the linear Stackelberg incenti...

The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learning algorithms naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic interpretation. We adopt this viewpoint model as two-player general-sum game with leader-follower structure known Stackelberg game. Given abstraction, we propose meta-framework for where leader player follows total derivative of its objecti...

Simultaneous (Nash) and sequential (Stackelberg) equilibria of two-player dynamic quadratic cheap talk and signaling game problems are investigated under a perfect Bayesian formulation. For the dynamic scalar cheap talk, a zero-delay communication setup is considered for i.i.d. and Markov sources; it is shown that the final stage equilibrium is always quantized and under further restrictive con...