This paper describes LaoGEM (Lao General Equilibrium Model), a 20 sector, 400 household general equilibrium model of the Lao economy, constructed specifically for the analysis of the effect of road improvement on rural poverty incidence in Laos. Unless otherwise stated, the database of the model refers to the year 2002. These features are relatively standard for comparative static general equil...

Oscillatory behavior in a chain of masses connected by springs with continuous but non-monotonic spring forces can be induced under quasi-static loading. Insight into the birth of this behavior is obtained from a single mass system. A bifurcation study shows the potential for equilibrium jumps between multiple equilibria. As such, the transients occurring under quasi-static loading do not conve...

This paper investigates the interrelations between social control mechanisms, social networks and collective action. We introduce a game theoretical model that explains how and under what conditions social networks rationalize participation in collective action and how can collective action reshape network relations in single encounters. The key mobilizing forces in collective action are interp...

We consider social learning settings in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, observe private signals, share the same utility function, and act in a general dynamic setting. We introduce Social Learning Equilibria, a static equilibrium concept that abstracts away from the details of the given dynamics, but nevertheless captures the corresponding asymptotic equ...

Static stability of equilibrium in strategic games differs from dynamic stability in not being linked to any particular dynamical system. In other words, it does not make any assumptions about off-equilibrium behavior. Examples of static notions of stability include evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and continuously stable strategy (CSS), both of which are meaningful or justifiable only for ...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it diffi cult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games including the prisoners’dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign dia...

We present new static axially symmetric solutions of SU(2) Yang-Mills-Higgs theory, representing chains of monopoles and antimonopoles in static equilibrium. They correspond to saddlepoints of the energy functional and exist both in the topologically trivial sector and in the sector with topological charge one.

This Appendix is organized as follows. First, in Section A.1, we discuss a variant of a static disclosure model that provides a numerical result and analytical insights we later use in the proof of Proposition 1. This variant of the static model may also be of independent interest. Then, in Section A.2 we provide a proof of the Proposition. The proof starts with noticing properties of the equil...

Standard equilibrium concepts in game theory find it difficult to explain the empirical evidence from a large number of static games, including the prisoners’ dilemma game, the hawk-dove game, voting games, public goods games and oligopoly games. Under uncertainty about what others will do in one-shot games, evidence suggests that people often use evidential reasoning (ER), i.e., they assign di...

A model framework, SIMBIOSES, is presented which describes economic activities and related material, substance and energy flows in a multi-region and multi-sector economic system. The conceptual design of the framework is discussed in relation to current issues on “dematerialization” and “decoupling”. Three types of models to implement SIMBIOSES are discussed: a static equilibrium model, a dyna...