I am honored to present this lecture in tribute to Nancy L. Schwartz. I did not know Professor Schwartz well, yet I am aware of her important professional contributions. First and foremost are the direct advances to the profession made through her writings. But also her indirect contributions, as a teacher and an intellectual leader, are very important. Some of the ideas and applications discus...

Arrow’s impossibility theorem states that if a collective choice rule satisfies unrestricted domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and collective rationality, then there exists a dictator. Among others, Arrow’s postulate of collective rationality is controversial. We propose a new axiom for a collective choice rule, decisiveness coherence, which is weaker than collective...

The paper discusses rationality at two levels. According to a common opinion the key to rationality at the group level is a willingness to contribute unselfishly at the individual level. I claim that even when rationality at the individual level is denied, it is often achieved by social punishment. The difficulty to organize a social project is exaggerated. The relative ease of implementing ind...

The influence of IT investments on organizational performance is revisited. Bounded rationality, organizational controls, and political forces may constrain optimal selection of inputs and appropriate substitution between inputs. For example, firms may not be able to attain an optimal level of IT by substituting IT for labor (for reasons such as pressure from the labor union). Besides estimatin...