We examine the role of central bank transparency when the private sector is modeled as adaptive learners. In our model, transparent policies enable the private sector to adopt correctly specified models of inflation and output while intransparent policies do not. In the former case, the private sector learns the rational expectations equilibrium while in the latter case it learns a restricted p...

A dynamic spatial model is constructed where there is a role for money and for centralized payments arrangements, and where there are aggregate fluctuations driven by fluctuations in aggregate productivity. With decentralized monetary exchange and no centralized payments arrangements, there is price level indeterminacy, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. A private clearinghouse arra...

This paper presents a regime-switching model of the yield curve with two states. One is a normal state, the other is a zero-bound state that represents the case when the monetary policy target rate is at its zero lower bound for a prolonged period. The model delivers estimates of the time-varying probability of exiting the zero-bound state, and it outperforms standard threeand four-factor term ...

Using a New-Keynesian framework, we investigate how far the inflationary processes in member states of EMU cause regional price levels to converge. We fail to produce hard evidence of the present existence of such an adjustment mechanism, notwithstanding that inflation in some countries tends to converge towards the euro area level. Overall, inflation persistence has declined significantly over...

The paper examines optimal monetary policy delegation in an economy where wages are set strategically by a single economy-wide union whose objectives relate to employment and the real wage. Crucially, the central bank exerts imprecise control over inflation, giving rise to a positive relationship between the mean value of inflation and its variance. In this context, union concerns with regard t...

This paper presents a toolkit for generating optimal policy projections. It makes five contributions. First, the requires minimal set of inputs: only baseline projection target and instrument variables impulse responses those to shocks. Second, it solves projections under commitment, limited-time discretion. Third, handles multiple instruments. Fourth, constraints on instruments such as lower b...