Suppose κ is λ-supercompact witnessed by an elementary embedding j : V →M with critical point κ, and further suppose that F is a function from the class of regular cardinals to the class of cardinals satisfying the requirements of Easton’s theorem: (1) ∀α α < cf(F (α)) and (2) α < β =⇒ F (α) ≤ F (β). In this article we address the question: assuming GCH, what additional assumptions are necessar...

The concept of occupationalther­ apy as a "science of adaptive responses," as proposed by King in her 7978 Eleanor Clarke Slagle Lecture, is explored and expanded on in this article. The authors pos­ tulate an adaptation continuum consIsting of homeostatzc reac­ tions, adaptive responses, adaptIVe skills, and adaptive patterns-a continuum that places the adap­ tive response in a sequential and ...

In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The predictions of the model are found to be highly consiste...

We present an algorithm that computes the structure of a finite abelian group G from a generating system M . The algorithm executes O(|M | √ |G|) group operations and stores O( √ |G|) group elements.

In this paper we examine the cardinal structure of inner models that satisfy GCH but do not contain 0. We show, assuming that 0 exists, that such models necessarily contain Mahlo cardinals of high order, but without further assumptions need not contain a cardinal κ which is κ-Mahlo. The principal tools are the Covering Theorem for L and the technique of reverse Easton iteration. Let I denote th...

In coalitional games with side payments, the core predicts which coalitions form and how benefits are shared. The predictions however run into difficulties if the core is empty or if some coalitions benefit from not blocking truthfully. These difficulties are analyzed in games in which an a priori given collection of coalitions can form, as the collection of pairs of buyer-seller in an assignme...