¿Constituyen las analogías a priori un tipo de argumento distinto los argumentos deductivos? Mi objetivo en este artículo es abordar esta larga polémica. Basándome una tesis general acerca la relación entre nuestra capacidad aplicar conceptos y intuitiva argumentar lógicamente, sostengo que principios fundamentación racional empleamos son esencialmente mismos argumentación deductiva. Por consig...

the proofs of god's existence are among the main questions of philosophers. this question has a special importance in spinoza's works, because it constitutes the basis of his philosophy. in his main work, ethics, he initiates the discussion with the definition of god and ends it up with man's noblest happiness, namely love of god. he deals with the issue in his different works an...

The paradigm of Aristotelian science continues to cause tension between scientific and literary language. Aristotle’s scientific legacy, the dominance of a strictly logical method, disbars and degrades any methodology which it deems not as rigorous. Accordingly, the scientific tradition enthrones the use of unambiguous language because it assumes that Aristotle’s systematic methodology rejects ...

This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with ‘KA’ abbreviating ‘it is knowable a priori that’). (AK) For all /, w such that / semantically presupposes w: if KA/; KAw: Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative it...

Tyler Burge offers a theory of testimony that allows for the possibility of both testimonial a priori warrant and testimonial a priori knowledge. I uncover a tension in his account of the relationship between the two, and locate its source in the analogy that Burge draws between testimonial warrant and preservative memory. I contend that this analogy should be rejected, and offer a revision of ...

Basically, A is a reason for B, if A speaks in favor of B, or makes B more plausible, or is positively relevant to B. And basically, a doxastic feature is a priori, if all rational doxastic states have that feature. The paper will unfold these notions. And it will argue, partially in a deductive way, for a series of a priori principles about the structure of reasons, starting with a basic empir...

In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argue for and apply a naturalistic semantic methodology to defend an anti-holistic truth-referential view of meaning. The naturalism in question is an epistemological doctrine that I take from Quine: there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is the basis of science (whatever that way may be). So I reject “a priori knowledge.” I do not give a deta...