In this study, we investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men do in the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding in the second-price auction. At a biolo...

Most research examining individuals’ bidding behavior in online auctions has used the lens of a rational decision making process. However, bidding behavior is also influenced by non-rational factors. Anthropomorphism, attributing human characteristics to a non-human object, has been studied in many disciplines, but has not been investigated in online auctions. This study aims to identify whethe...

This paper introduced the application of game theory in electricity power market. Moreover, the electricity pool model and the merit order dispatch method was introduced. In pool mode, participants are trying to maximize their benefit via competition with each other. Hence the market can be regarded as a non-cooperative game, especially, the electrical supply competition. Players (generators) c...

For electricity market participants trading in sequential markets with differences in price levels and risk exposure, coordinated bidding is highly relevant. We consider a Nordic power producer who engages in the day-ahead spot market and the near real-time balancing market. In both markets, clearing prices and dispatched volumes are unknown at the time of bidding. However, in the balancing mar...

We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation of potential “outsiders.” Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members. It is found t...

Previous work has addressed the relative vulnerability of di¤erent auction schemes to collusive bidding. The common wisdom is that ascending-bid and second-price auctions are highly susceptible to collusion. We show that the details of ascending-bid and second price auctions, including bidder registration procedures and procedures for information revelation during the auction, can be designed t...

In this paper a novel approach for sequential bidding on day-ahead auction markets for spot energy and power systems reserve is presented. For the spot market a relatively simple method is considered as a competitive market is assumed. For the reserve market one bidder is assumed to behave strategically and the behavior of the competitors is summarized in a probability distribution of the marke...

The main objective of a bidding agent in TAC SCM is to get profitable orders and to get enough orders to keep the production going. There is a delicate balance that the bidding agent needs to maintain while deciding on which specific orders to bid and what bidding price to set. In this highly complex bidding problem with (i) many inter-dependencies, (ii) multiple information flows, (iii) histor...

On the basis of the bidding history of a panel of new eBay bidders, we examine the impact of different types of experiences on bidding behavior evolution. Accounting for unobserved bidder heterogeneity, the results indicate that losing experiences make the bidders’ bidding behavior evolve toward the normative predictions of auction theory, in that they submit fewer bids and bid later. Winning e...

We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students’ reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading manipulation observed in the course allocation mechanism currently used at Harvard Business School (HBS). The proxy bidding mechanism simplifes students’ decisions by directly incorporating downgrading into the mechanism. O...