A single unit of a good is to be sold by auction to one of many potential buyers. There are two equally likely states of the world. Potential buyers receive noisy signals of the state of the world. The accuracies of buyers ’ signals may differ. A buyer’s valuation is the sum of a common value component that depends on the state and an idiosyncratic private value component independent of the sta...

In the environment of business‐to‐business e‐commerce, Buyers and sellers in mature industrial markets can turn single transactions into long-term beneficial relationships by a deeper understanding of the complex connection between the two and buyers and sellers are uncertain about their roles. A “must-do” for the sellers, in particular, is to understand patterns of investment and reward,...

Many factors innuence a learning process and the performance of a learned classiier. In this paper we investigate the eeects of class distribution in the training set on performance. We also study diierent methods of measuring performance based on cost models and the performance eeects of training class distribution with respect to the diierent cost models. Observations from these eeects help u...

Many factors innuence a learning process and the performance of a learned classiier. In this paper we investigate the performance eeects of class distribution in the training set. We also study diierent methods of measuring performance based on cost models and the performance eeects of training class distribution with respect to the diierent cost models. Observations from these eeects help us d...

Abstract Prior studies show that coordinating supply chain inventories with common replenishment epochs (CRE) provides benefit for vendor and buyers. Coordination using selective discount (SD) strategy allows some buyers to participate in the coordination scheme while other buyers continue to order as earlier. This can reduce the vendor’s total cost more than that of all buyers participating an...

This paper studies price dynamics in a setting in which a monopolist sells a new experience good over time to many buyers, and the seller can neither price discriminate among the buyers nor commit to a price rule. Buyers learn from their own experiences about the effectiveness of the product. Individual learning generates ex post heterogeneity, which affects the buyers’ purchasing decisions, th...

In the context of electronic commerce, when modeling the trustworthiness of selling agent relies (in part) on propagating ratings provided by buying agents that have personal experience with the seller, the problem of unfair ratings arises. Extreme diversity of open and dynamic electronic marketplaces causes difficulties in handling unfair ratings in trust management systems. To ease this probl...

In this paper, we explore the use of the web as an environment for electronic commerce. In particular, we develop a novel mechanism that creates incentives for honesty in electronic marketplaces where human users are represented by buying and selling agents. In our mechanism, buyers model other buyers and select the most trustworthy ones as their neighbors from which they can ask advice about s...