Cloud computing is a demanding business platform for services related to the field of IT. The goal cloud customers access resources at sustainable price, while suppliers maximize their utilization. Previously, would bid every single resource type, which was limitation allocation. To solve these issues, researchers have focused on combinatorial auction in are offered by providers bundles so that...

We study the design of truthful auction mechanisms for maximizing the seller’s profit. We focus on the case when the auction mechanism does not have any knowledge of bidders’ valuations, especially of their upper bound. For the Single-Item auction, we obtain an “asymptotically” optimal scheme: for any k ∈ Z and ǫ > 0, we give a randomized truthful auction that guarantees an expected profit of Ω...

The current art in optimal combinatorial auctions is limited to handling the case of single units of multiple items, with each bidder bidding on exactly one bundle (single minded bidders). This paper extends the current art by proposing an optimal auction for procuring multiple units of multiple items when the bidders are single minded. The auction minimizes the cost of procurement while satisf...

We review the uses of economic theory in the initial design and later improvement of the “simultaneous ascending auction,” which was developed initially for the sale of radio spectrum licenses in the US, with efficiency of the final allocation as the statutory goal. We analyze some capabilities and inherent limitations of the auction, the roles of various detailed rules, the possibilities for i...

The combinatorial clock auction has become popular for large-scale spectrum awards and other uses, replacing more traditional ascending or clock auctions. We describe some surprising properties of the auction, including a wide range of ex post equilibria with demand expansion, demand reduction, and predation. Our results obtain in a standard homogeneous good setting where bidders have well-beha...

The combinatorial clock-proxy auction is analyzed as a selling mechanism of a portion of the “digital dividend” in an European country.We assumed bidders with bounded rationality making their bidding decisions based on a system of recommendation that learns from the environment. The auction outcome when all bidders follow the proposed strategies was compared with the efficient outcome of the au...

Quantity discount is a frequently adopted scheme that has not been explicitly investigated in logistics service procurement auctions. This paper focuses on revised winner determination problem under quantity discounts and demand uncertainty for fourth-party (4PL) provider combinatorial reverse auction. To characterize our research problem, two-stage stochastic nonlinear programming model constr...

Combinatorial auctions, i.e. auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more eecient allocations than traditional auctions in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners so as to maximize revenue is NP-complete. First, existing approaches for tackling this problem are reviewed: exhaustive enu-mera...