In this paper, the classical theory of two-person cooperative games is extended to two-person cooperative games with interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ α-values are introduced and characterizations are given. Some economical situations with an interval character are considered.

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on mergingand splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. JEL classification: C71, D23, D71.

Nash originated general non-cooperative game theory in seminal articles in the early 1950s by formally distinguishing between non-cooperative and cooperative models and by developing the concept of equilibrium for noncooperative games. Nash developed the first bargaining solution characterized by axioms, pioneered methods and criteria for relating cooperativetheory solution concepts and non-coo...