a r t i c l e i n f o This paper features a simple static Cournot–Nash model of an exchange economy with two productive sectors at flexible prices and wages. The traders in the atomless sector are price-takers, while the atoms behave strategically. We focus on the consequences of strategic interactions on the market outcome. Firstly, strategic interactions create underemployment on the labor ma...

We investigate the Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium model with concave cost function. We show that in this case the model can be formulated as a mixed variational inequality on its convex, compact strategy set, which, in general, may fail to exist an equilibrium point. We give conditions under which the model has an equilibrium point. We then propose an algorithm for finding an equ...

We study the existence of Cournot equilibria in multimarket oligopolies under the additional restriction that every firm may sell its product only to a limited number of markets simultaneously. This situation naturally arises if market entry is subject to a valid license and each firm holds a fixed number of licenses only, or, equivalently, if the firms’ short-term assets only suffice to serve ...

We study an oligopoly consisting of M leaders and N followers that supply a homogeneous product (or service) noncooperatively. Leaders choose their supply levels first, knowing the demand function only in distribution. Followers make their decisions after observing the leader supply levels and the realized demand function. We term the resulting equilibrium a stochastic multiple-leader Stackelbe...

We explore the effect of the limited ability to process information on the convergence of firms toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot oligopoly with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that while market production is close to equilibrium, firm production is relatively far fro...

In a market in which a vertically integrated producer (VIP) supplies an essential input to a retail rival, we explore the role of managerial delegation when it shapes downstream firms’ incentives and determine the endogenous choice of delegation under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. The equilibrium choice of acting as a managerial firm, which is a standard result in literature of strateg...

This paper examines the strategic use of debt financing in a quantity-setting duopoly with asymmetric costs. Before output competition (Cournot or Stackelberg) demand uncertainty takes place, both firms can strategically choose to issue commit an aggressive stance. We find that debt, serving as commitment device, help disadvantaged firm ( i.e. , high-cost Cournot follower Stackelberg competitio...