Various experimental studies have shown that the availability of a punishment option can increase the prevalence of cooperative behaviour in repeated social dilemmas. A punishment option should only matter if it is a credible threat. We investigate if the degree of credibility depends on standard strategic equilibrium considerations (i.e. SPNE or NE logic) or stems from a non-strategic motivati...

This paper offers a model of optimism, pessimism, and cognitive dissonance. Beliefs—and consequently choices—depend not only on relevant information, but also on what makes the decision maker better-off. In an associated experiment, subjects who stood to gain from an increase in the price of a financial asset predicted higher prices than subjects who stood to gain from a decrease in price. Cons...

In this study I present experimental evidence of a novel channel yielding inequality persistence. In an initial experiment, results suggest that individuals respond to salient inequality by adjusting their performance beliefs to justify the inequality. Subsequent experiments reveal: i) that it is beliefs about relative ability—an ostensibly stable trait— rather than effort provision that respon...

We study a model in which individual agents use simple linear first order price forecasting rules, adapting them to the complex evolving market environment with a smart Genetic Algorithm optimization procedure. The novelties are: (1) a parsimonious experimental foundation of individual forecasting behaviour; (2) an explanation of individual and aggregate behavior in four different experimental ...

The joint assumptions of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and imperfect capital market lead to non-convexities in selves’ objective functions that may imply discontinuous equilibrium strategies. If this property was early recognized, authors generally take assumptions on parameters that allow to avoid the problem. In contrast to the literature, I choose to give a full characterization of these stra...

This paper develops a framework for the design of optimal structured products (equityor index-linked notes) allowing us to analyze the maximal utility gain for an investor that can be achieved by introducing structured products. We demonstrate with data from three of the largest markets for structured products (USA, Germany and Switzerland) that most of the successful structured products are no...

We examine the characteristics of effective leaders in a simple leader-follower voluntary contributions game. We focus on two factors: the individual’s cooperativeness and the individual’s beliefs about the cooperativeness of others. We find that groups perform best when led by those who are cooperatively inclined. Partly, this reflects a false consensus effect: cooperative leaders are more opt...

We show that professional soccer players exhibit reference-dependent behavior during matches. Controlling for the state of the match and for unobserved heterogeneity, we show on a minute-by-minute basis that a player breaches the rules of the game, measured by the referee’s assignment of cards, with a significantly higher probability if his team is behind the expected match outcome, measured by...

This paper studies lying. An agent randomly picks a number from a known distribution. She can then report any number and receive a monetary payoff based only on her report. The paper presents a model of lying costs that generates hypotheses regarding behavior. In an experiment, we find that the highest fraction of lies is from reporting the maximal outcome, but some participants do not make the...

We test the hypothesis that, when thinking about allocating money to a stock, investors mentally represent the stock by the distribution of its past returns and then evaluate this distribution in the way described by prospect theory. In a simple model of asset prices in which some investors think in this way, a stock whose past return distribution has a high (low) prospect theory value earns a ...