We investigate the quantization of games in which the players can access to a continuous set of classical strategies, making use of continuous-variable quantum systems. For the particular case of the Cournot’s Duopoly, we find that, even though the two players both act as “selfishly” in the quantum game as they do in the classical game, they are found to virtually cooperate due to the quantum e...

We investigate the quantization of games in which the players can access to a continuous set of classical strategies, making use of continuous-variable quantum systems. For the particular case of the Cournot’s Duopoly, we find that, even though the two players both act as “selfishly” in the quantum game as they do in the classical game, they are found to virtually cooperate due to the quantum e...

Abstract—A dynamic of Bertrand duopoly game is analyzed, where players use different production methods and choose their prices with bounded rationality. The equilibriums of the corresponding discrete dynamical systems are investigated. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process are studied. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment...

We employ a dynamic duopoly game with evolving demand structure to study the interplay between the firms’ product innovation activities and their investments in capacities for an established product. After deriving a Markovperfect equilibrium we conclude that the firm with a larger market share for the established product is less likely to be the first innovator. Innovation activity is negative...

Firms that want to increase the sales of their brands through advertising have the choice of capturing market share from their competitors through brand advertising, or increasing primary demand for the category through generic advertising. In this paper, differential game theory is used to analyze the effects of the two types of advertising decisions made by firms offering a product in a dynam...

In this paper, a dynamic game model of duopoly firms between the traditional electric power enterprises and new energy enterprises was established for analyzing the behaviors of electric power enterprises under different government carbon taxes policies and the corresponding Nash equilibrium. This goal of the model was set to maximize the total social welfare while considering the economic, soc...

Abstract We study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited their capacity production engage in two stage game. In first they commit to levels not exceeding capacities which are then made common knowledge. second after has taken place firms simultaneously compete prices. Solution this sequential game shows that unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as is always...

Article history: Accepted 19 February 2012 JEL classification: C72 D01 D43 L13

We study firms' optimal investment behavior in a dynamic duopoly framework. Embodied technological progress makes later generations more productive. The resulting model is a differential game combined with a vintage capital goods structure. Since such a framework has not been analyzed before, existing concepts have to be modified. Our numerical analysis first shows that a technological breakthr...