The electronic mail game [8] or “email game” is a coordination game with two possible states, a and b. In each state, players are trying to coordinate their actions so that both play A (in a) or B (in b). The first case happens more than half the time, and the second is not only less frequent but also carries a penalty if only one player chooses B. So in the absence of extra information, it mak...

Support for strong electronic mail security is widely available yet only few communicants appear to make use of these features. Apparently, the operational overhead of security outweighs its perceived benefits. Towards increasing the benefits versus overhead ratio we follow an approach that considers security and usability tradeoffs from the outset. We separate key exchange from binding keys to...

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game’s payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other’s private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. And even though the precisions of both signal types is exogeno...

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game’s payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other’s private information. We show that once agents possess these different types of information, there exists a coordination game in the evaluation of this information. And even though the precisions of both signal types is exogeno...

The design and implementation of a conceptual model, CAFE (a Categorization Assistant For E-mail), is Marchionini [16] (p. 1) states, the general consequences of the information society we live in are threefold: we have larger volumes of information, new forms and aggregations of CAFE: A Conceptual Model for Managing Information in Electronic Mail Juha Takkinen and Nahid Shahmehri Laboratory fo...

Junk e-mail or spam is rapidly choking off e-mail as a reliable and efficient means of communication over the Internet. Although the demand for human attention increases rapidly with the volume of information and communication, the HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION, 2005, Volume 20, pp. 195–223 Copyright © 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. Robert Kraut is a social psychologist with interests in ...

This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game (Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make explicit the role of knowledge about rat...

During the past few years, spam has invaded electronic mail boxes and become one of the major challenges for information systems (IS) professionals. Spam decreases user productivity, erodes electronic mail reliability, and requires the maintenance of spam-filtering software that drains the IS budget. Although spam is the largest type of electronic mail received, spam levels have begun to decrea...