We> have> investigated the> relation between static stability of a limb, equilibrium-point control, and the ill-posed problem of coordinating a redundant ensemble of muscles. Geometrically, equilibrium-point control is equivalent to establishing a mapping between the command signals delivered to the muscles and the equilibrium corfiguraiions ofa limb. A necessary condition for the existence ofs...

There are typically multiple equilibrium outcomes in the Crawford-Sobel (CS) model of strategic information transmission. This note identifies a simple condition on equilibrium payoffs, called NITS, that selects among CS equilibria. Under a commonly used regularity condition, only the equilibrium with the maximal number of induced actions satisfies NITS. We discuss various justifications for NI...

The known nonlinear mathematical model of the Glassy-winged Sharpshooter is considered. It is assumed that this model is influenced by stochastic perturbations of the white noise type and these perturbations are directly proportional to the deviation of the system state from the positive equilibrium point. A necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic mean square stability of the equilibr...

We analyze the asymptotic behavior of agents engaged in a infinite horizon partially observable stochastic game formalized by the interactive POMDP framework. We show that when agents’ initial beliefs satisfy a truth compatibility condition, their behavior converges to a subjective 2-equilibrium in a finite time, and subjective equilibrium in the limit. Imposing an additional assumption of mutu...

In a random-matching economy of traders who maximize cumulative consumption (overtaking criterion), the stationary, Markov, Bayesian-perfect equilibrium is studied. At such equilibrium, two results hold: (1) perfect substitutability between current and future consumption implies a no-surplus condition; and (2) by the no-surplus condition, there is a nominal price at which all trades must occur....

This paper provides a price equilibrium existence theorem in economies where commodities may be indivisible and aggregate excess demand functions may be discontinuous. We introduce a very weak notion of continuity, called recursive transfer lower semi-continuity, which is weaker than transfer lower semi-continuity and in turn weaker than lower semicontinuity. It is shown that the condition, tog...

This paper establishes and interprets a necessary and sufficient condition for existence of (countably additive) correlated equilibrium in n-person games, assuming only that utility functions are bounded, measurable. A sequence of deviation profiles is consistent if there exists a correlated strategy that makes every profile in the sequence unprofitable with respect to the sum of utilities. An ...

This note provides a price equilibrium existence theorem in economies where commodities may be indivisible and aggregate excess demand functions may be discontinuous or do not have any structure except Walras’ Law. We establish a condition, called recursive transfer lower semi-continuity, which is weaker than transfer lower semi-continuity and in turn weaker than lower semi-continuity, for the ...

In this paper, we characterize the equilibrium price of a prediction market in which risk averse traders have heterogeneous beliefs in probabilities. We show that the prediction market is accurate, in the sense that the equilibrium price equals the mean beliefs of traders, if and only if the utility function of traders is logarithmic. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the...

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative n-person game in the strategic form. As is well known, the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, it does not always have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Wherein, Topkis (1979), Iimura (2003), and Sato and Kawasaki (2009) provided a sufficient condition for the game to have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, they did not consi...