This article is concerned with the characterization and existence of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) in Games against Nature, a class of models described by ®nite size populations and absolute ®tness measures. We address these problems in terms of a new formalism which revolves around the concept evolutionary entropy, a measure of the diversity of options associated with a strategy ± pur...

In this paper we consider Nash Equilibria for the selfish routing model proposed in [12], where a set of n users with tasks of different size try to access m parallel links with different speeds. In this model, a player can use a mixed strategy (where he uses different links with a positive probability); then he is indifferent between the different link choices. This means that the player may w...

In a series of seminal articles in 1974, 1975, and 1977, J. H. Gillespie challenged the notion that the "fittest" individuals are those that produce on average the highest number of offspring. He showed that in small populations, the variance in fecundity can determine fitness as much as mean fecundity. One likely reason why Gillespie's concept of within-generation bet hedging has been largely ...

A generalized Beverton-Holt model is considered in which a parameter gamma characterizes the onset of density dependence. An evolutionary stable strategy analysis of this parameter, reported in Getz (1996), is developed further here, using invasion exponents and the strategy dynamics of Vincent et al. (1993). The parameter gamma is also allowed to be density dependent, and it is shown that the ...

In this paper, we discuss some matrix techniques in game theory. In particular, we give a short proof of the fact that equilibrium pairs of a two-person general-sum game can be found by solving certain systems of linear inequalities, and hence some standard linear programming packages such as LINDO or Maple can be used to do the computation. The technique is also used to study evolutionary game...

We present a class of evolutionary games involving large populations that have many pairwise interactions between randomly selected players. The fitness of a player depends not only on the actions chosen in the interaction but also on the individual state of the players. Players stay permanently in the system and participate infinitely often in local interactions with other randomly selected pl...

In this paper we present a new framework to analyze the behavior of evolutionary 2×2 symmetric games. The proposed approach enanbles us to predict the dynamics of the system using the parameters of the game matrix above, without dealing with the concepts of Nash equilibria and evolutionary stable strategies. The predictions are in complete accordance with those that can be made with these latte...

We revisit the question of price formation in general equilibrium theory. We explore whether evolutionary forces lead to Walrasian equilibrium in the context of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market games have Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some, and possibly all, markets are closed. We introduce a strong version of evolutionary stable strategies (SESS) for fini...