What political institutions improve property rights? Building on the work of North and Weingast, this article argues that institutional checks on policymaking discretion (“veto players”) improve the property rights of investors regarding the value of the domestic currency. Veto players constrain the ability of policy makers to opportunistically pursue policy that may lead to a depreciated domes...

Literature suggests three compensation principles for property expropriation – full, lump sum and market value. While it is difficult to judge which principle is superior, there is no doubt that everyone should be treated equally. Owners of property in Taiwan are required through valuation practices rather than by legislation to give up part of their property value in the public interest. Compe...

We argue five main propositions. First, the choice between royalties and profit-based taxation involves an efficiency tradeoff, between diminished incentives to produce output on one hand, and diminished incentives to minimise costs on the other (as in Laffont and Tirole, 1993). So the Brown tax is indeed a tax, and one that reduces the incentive to mine. Next, the ex post Resource Super Profit...

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or investments which produce a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. It is shown that investments may be either abov...

We develop a theory for a transition economy under which an unbalanced development strategy that favors special economic zones emerges as a response to two critical problems: (1) political pressure to satisfy certain social expenditure requirements, and (2) the lack of institutions to constrain the state from expropriation. By promoting the concentration of resources in some areas, a low equili...

We investigate whether controlling shareholders expropriate corporate resources during a financial crisis using the data of Thai firms. Our results are consistent with the argument of Friedman, Johnson, and Mitton (2003) that the propensity to tunnel and prop is higher for business groups in particular if they are organized in pyramids. Specifically, we find that firms that belong to the top 30...

The declaration of detriment to the public interest, as a mechanism for ex officio review favorable acts, is particularly significant in relation expropriation procedure. This study will analyze possibilities when it comes proceeding tothe different administrative acts that make up proceedings, with special emphasis on setting price by Expropriation Juries. Likewise, legal problems derived from...