Economists and psychologists have documented patterns of individual decision–making behavior (e.g., loss aversion) whereby losses and gains are treated differently. However, there has been little evidence of such patterns in multi–player games. We report results showing the strongest evidence we know of that this phenomenon is present in games. Experimental subjects play two hawk–dove games tha...

A wide range of ecological and evolutionary models predict variety in phenotype or behavior when a population is at equilibrium. This heterogeneity can be realized in different ways. For example, it can be realized through a complex population of individuals exhibiting different simple behaviors, or through a simple population of individuals exhibiting complex, varying behaviors. In some theore...

The concept of cross diffusion is applied to some biological systems. The conditions for persistence and Turing instability in the presence of cross diffusion are derived. Many examples including: predatorprey, epidemics (with and without delay), hawk-dove-retaliate and prisoner’s dilemma games are given.

Realistic models of contests between animals will often involve a series of state-dependent decisions by the contestants. Computation of evolutionarily stable strategies for such state-dependent dynamic games are usually based on damped iterations of the best response map. Typically this map is discontinuous so that iterations may not converge and even if they do converge it may not be clear if...

For games of simultaneous action selection and network formation, gametheoretic behavior and experimental observations are not in line: While theory typically predicts inefficient outcomes for (anti-)coordination games, experiments show that subjects tend to play efficient (non Nash) strategy profiles. A reason for this discrepancy is the tendency to model corresponding games as one-shot and de...

Infinite population models of co-evolutionary dynamics are useful mathematical constructs hinting at the possibility of a wide variety of possible dynamical regimes from simple attractive fixed point behavior, periodic orbits to complex chaotic dynamics. We propose to use the framework of shadowing lemma to link such mathematical constructs to large finite population computer simulations. We al...

We develop a model to describe the development of dominance relations between social animals as they use past experiences to inform future interactions. Using the gametheoretic framework of a Hawk-Dove game with asymmetric resource-holding potentials (RHPs), we derive a simple model that describes the social interactions of animals that compete for resources. We then consider a game-playing str...

We propose a stochastic model in evolutionary game theory where individuals (or subpopulations) can mutate changing their strategies randomly (but rarely) and explore the external environment. This environment affects the selective pressure by modifying the payoff arising from the interactions between strategies. We derive a Fokker-Plank integro-differential equation and provide Monte-Carlo sim...

Recently, models of evolution have begun to incorporate structured populations, including spatial structure, through the modelling of evolutionary processes on graphs (evolutionary graph theory). One limitation of this otherwise quite general framework is that interactions are restricted to pairwise ones, through the edges connecting pairs of individuals. Yet, many animal interactions can invol...