Abstract We investigate an extension of the Hotelling–Downs model to case where preferences voters do not have be single peaked. In candidates only care about winning or losing, assuming that a voter elects each candidate symmetrically with equal probability when indifferent, previous works by Fisher and Ryan Laffond, Laslier, Le Breton shown equilibrium outcome is unique. Uniqueness also holds...

purpose: e is a commonly use letter for illiterates or those who could not read english to measure visual acuity. the e chart is the mainly used charts in iran. however, they do not have the standards. they are in different format, fixed for 6 meter test, with or without lighting, with unequal number of letters in each line and different contrasts. as a result, there is an essential need for a ...

We consider the problem of a monopolist seller who is selling a good to a potential buyer and is privately informed about some of the good’s attributes. We focus on the case where goods with di¤erent attributes are horizontally di¤erentiated: they appeal di¤erently to di¤erent types of the buyer. Such a market is represented via a standard Hotelling (1929) model, where the seller’s and the buye...

The CCC-r chart is developed based on cumulative count of a conforming (CCC) control chart that considers the cumulative number of items inspected until observing r nonconforming ones. Typically, the samples obtained from the process are analyzed through 100% inspection to exploit the CCC-r chart. However, considering the inspection cost and time would limit its implementation. In this paper, w...

We study Hotelling’s classic duopoly location model in continuous time with flow payoffs accumulated over time and the price dimension made explicit. In an experimental setting, subjects chose price and location in treatments varying only by the speed of adjustment. We find that the principle of minimum differentiation generally holds, with little distance between subjects’ location decisions. ...

We investigate experimentally the impact of continuous time on a four-player Hotelling location game. The static pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) consists of firms paired-up at the first and third quartiles of the linear city. In repeated simultaneous move games (discrete time grid), we fail to obtain convergence to this distinctive NE, as have previous studies. However, with asynchronous mo...