“There are no gaps in logical space”, writes Lewis (1986), giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a pattern idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible”. Another is a cut and paste idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that con...

There is an argument that has yet to be made wholly explicit though it might be one of the most important in contemporary metaphysics. This paper is an attempt to rectify that omission. The argument is of such high importance because it involves a host of central concepts, concerning actuality, modality, groundedness and powers. If Ellis’s (2001) assessment is correct, the whole debate between ...

Some argue that time’s causal arrow is grounded in an underlying thermodynamic asymmetry. Often, this tied to Humean skepticism causes produce their effects, any robust sense of ‘produce’. Conversely, those who advocate stronger notions natural necessity often reject reductions arrow. Against these traditional pairings, I ‘reduction-plus-production’ coherent. Reductionists looking invoke produc...

A ‘Big Bad Bug’ threatens Lewis’s Humean metaphysics of chance (Lewis 1986a, p. XIV); his Principal Principle provides an intuitive link between and credence. Yet on the one hand, certain future developments are incompatible with true theory chance, but other such have a positive to occur. The combination these two claims leads inconsistent credences. I present solution Bug: chances relative li...

Although contemporary powers metaphysics largely understands itself as a metaphysical realist undertaking, recently have come to the surface also within an idealist context. This paper aims characterize and motivate absolute conception of powers. I compare in their respective responses Humean scepticism concerning powers, thereby motivating claim that very idea power is actually best understood...

Some have argued that the possibility of faultless disagreement gives relativist semantic theories an important explanatory advantage over their absolutist and contextualist rivals. Here I combat this argument, focusing on the specific case of aesthetic discourse. My argument has two stages. First, I argue that while relativists may be able to account for the possibility of faultless aesthetic ...