We study a generalization of the well known house allocation problem in which agents may own fractions of different houses summing to an arbitrary quantity, but have use for only the equivalent of one unit of a house. We also depart from the classical model by assuming that arbitrary quantities of each house may be available to the market. Justified envy considerations arise when two agents hav...

In this paper we quantify the extent and magnitude of agglomeration spillovers from a formal institution whose sole mission is the creation and dissemination of knowledge -the research university. We use the fact that universities follow a fixed endowment spending policy based on the market value of their endowments to identify the causal effect of the density of university activity on labor in...

Marriage, migration, and related phenomena such as marital stability, fertility, and investment in human capital may be better explained by studying marriage and migration jointly. This paper examines the role of migration in obtaining joint labor market and marriage market equilibrium. When broadly interpreted, marriage and migration share a number of common features. Both involve search an...

Soil and water conservation (SWC) practices have been promoted in the highlands of Ethiopia during the last four decades. However, the level of adoption of SWC practices varies greatly. This paper examines the drivers of different stages of adoption of SWC technologies in the north-western highlands of Ethiopia. This study is based on a detailed farm survey among 298 households in three watersh...

Creativity and the Family Tree: Human Capital Endowments and the Propensity of Entrepreneurs to Patent In this paper we show that the patenting behavior of creative entrepreneurs is correlated with the patenting behavior of their fathers, which we refer to as a source of the entrepreneurs’ human capital endowments. Our argument for this relationship follows from established theories of developm...

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We study a mechanism design problem for exchange economies where each agent is initially endowed with a set of indivisible goods and side payments are not allowed. We assume each agent can withhold some endowments, as well as misreport her preference. Under this assumption, strategyproofness requires that for each agent, reporting her true preference with revealing all her endowments is a domin...