Leakage-resilient cryptography aims to extend the rigorous guarantees achieved through the provable security paradigm to physical implementations. The constructions and mechanisms designed on basis of this new approach inevitably suffer from an Achilles heel: a bounded leakage assumption is needed. Currently, a huge gap exists between the theory of such designs and their implementation to confi...

In this paper, we show identity-based encryption (IBE) and inner product encryption (IPE) schemes which achieve the maximum-possible leakage rate 1 − o(1). These schemes are secure under the decision linear (DLIN) assumption in the standard model. Specifically, even if 1− o(1) fraction of each private key is arbitrarily leaked, the IBE scheme is fully secure and the IPE scheme is selectively se...

We propose a leakage-resilient signature scheme in the continual leakage model that is based on a well-known identity-based encryption scheme by Boneh and Boyen (Eurocrypt 2004). The proposed signature scheme is the most e cient among the existing schemes that allow for continual leakage. Its e ciency is close to that of non leakageresilient pairing-based signature schemes. It tolerates leakage...

We consider unconditionally secure leakage resilient two-party computation, where security means that the leakage obtained by an adversary can be simulated using a similar amount of leakage from the private inputs or outputs. A related problem is known as circuit compilation, where there is only one device doing a computation on public input and output. Here the goal is to ensure that the adver...

Side-channel attacks are a major threat for cryptographic mechanisms; yet, they are not considered in the computational model that is used by cryptographers for proving the security of their schemes. As a result, there are several efficient attacks against standardized implementations of provably secure schemes. Leakage resilient cryptography aims to extend provable security so that it can acco...

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret keys. In this work, we advance the modelling of AKE protocols by considering more granular, continuous leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants: the adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage of long-term secrets...

In this extended abstract, we explain a demo of the leakage-resilient authentication and data (key) management system which can be regarded as a prominent solution for secure cloud storage.

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to provide security even when the adversary learns certain secret keys. In this work, we advance the modelling of AKE protocols by considering more granular, continuous leakage of long-term secrets of protocol participants: the adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage of long-term secrets...