We introduce and motivate the concept of unclonable group identification, that provides maximal protection against sharing of identities while still protecting the anonymity of users. We prove that the notion can be realized from any one-way function and suggest a more efficient implementation based on specific assumptions.

As lawyers concerned with the regulation of economic activity, we applaud the recognition in Professor Charles Goodhart’s recent Chorley lecture that much of the ‘law and economics’ of the past quarter-century has involved ‘too much one-way traffic’. If law and economics has indeed largely, as Professor Goodhart suggests, consisted of a process of intellectual imperialism, specifically of the c...

• We compare 20 carsharing user groups in a medium-sized urban environment. Partial overlapping reveals interdependencies among the groups. The differ considerably their spatial and temporal usage behavior. Promoting with anticyclical behavior helps to balance occupation rates. of free-floating station-based differs several aspects. rapidly developing concept is an essential scalable part susta...

We present a comprehensive and universal quantum computing model based on 2-qubit measurements (TQC), which embeds trivially in a model based on 1-qubit measurements known as the one-way model (1WQC). One inherits through this embedding a calculus whereby each TQC computing pattern can be put in a standard form where entanglement is done first, then measurement, then local corrections.

Many of the popular Merkle-Damg̊ard hash functions have turned out to be not collision-resistant (CR). The problem is that we no longer know if these hash functions are even second-preimage-resistant (SPR) or one-way (OW), without the underlying compression functions being CR. We remedy this situation by introducing the “split padding” into a current Merkle-Damg̊ard hash function H. The patched h...

MD2 is an early hash function developed by Ron Rivest for RSA Security, that produces message digests of 128 bits. In this paper, we show that MD2 does not reach the ideal security level of 2. We describe preimage attacks against the underlying compression function, the best of which has complexity of 2. As a result, the full MD2 hash can be attacked in preimage with complexity of 2.