Michael Tye has recently argued that the phenomenal character of conscious experiences is “one and the same as” (1) Poised (2) Abstract (3) Non-conceptual (4) Intentional Content (PANIC). Tye argues extensively that PANIC Theory accounts for differences in phenomenal character in representational terms. But another task of a theory of phenomenal consciousness is to account for the difference be...

My epistemic goal in this lecture will be the simplest form of phenomenal selfconsciousness: I want to contribute to a deeper understanding of nonconceptual, pre-reflexive layers in conscious selfrepresentation. Conceptually, I will defend the claim that agency is not part of the metaphysically necessary supervenience-basis for bodily self-consciousness. On the level of new empirical data I wan...

This paper describes how early designs of dynamic weightless neural systems were developed to enable some of the states of a state structure to have a phenomenal character. Such states reflect the features of a sensory reality and allow the storage of aspects of sensory experience and access to it. The ‘machine consciousness’ paradigm is summarised in this paper. The paper concludes with a desc...

To Kevin, tireless organizer of philosophical research, tremendously generous supporter of young people, delightful host, brilliant philosopher (in random order). With herzlichen Dank, for the great sympathy and encouragement he has given me. I hope he will forgive me for dedicating to him this paper, which seems not to be much concerned with his philosophical work; but I am comforted by the fa...

Recent work in experimental psychology and neuroscience has revealed a rather surprising architecture for early (or preattentive) perceptual processes. This paper will describe some of the surprising features of that architecture, and how they bear on recent philosophical debates about the notion of phenomenal consciousness. I will argue that the common sense idea that states of phenomenal cons...

On a natural description of what a mundane visual experience is like for its subject—of its phenomenal character, of how it is phenomenally—such an experience is phenomenally a direct or immediate awareness of entities in the scene before the subject’s eyes. For example, according to Strawson (1979, 97), “mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as [ . . . ] an immediate consciou...

In a series of papers and lectures, Sydney Shoemaker has developed a sophisticated Russellian theory of phenomenal content (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has as its central motivation two considerations. One is the possibility of spectrum-inversion without illusion. The other is the transparency of experience. Consider the possibility of spectrum inversion. It might be that the color experience J...

The paper deals with the phenomenal trust modelling. Required terms as trust, trust types, trust values and representation are mentioned. Fundamental description of phenomenal trust formation is presented as a form of impersonal trust which is complementary to interpersonal trust. Phenomenon is defined by the set of its possible exclusive values. The model describes the trust of a subject to pa...

We report three experiments in which visual or audiovisual displays depicted a surface (target) set into motion shortly after one or more events occurred. A visual motion was used as an initial event, followed directly either by the target motion or by one of three marker events: a collision sound, a blink of the target stimulus, or the blink together with the sound. The delay between the initi...