I discuss Minnis [2010] in the context of the broader literature on private firm financing. In particular, I focus on the unique features of the private firm setting and how it affects research design and inference. I detail the alternative information sources available to debt financiers of private firms that may limit the role of auditors and firm financial statements. I review research in th...

We thank Greg Udell, Patricia Wilson, and participants at the 1995 FMA meetings for helpful comments and discussions. We are responsible for any mistakes that remain. The views in this paper are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. Abstract We examine a firm's choice between public and private debt in a model where the firm's financing...

a r t i c l e i n f o This paper analyzes the relationships between firms' external search of knowledge and its role in cooperation strategies for innovation. In particular, this study accounts for differences between public and private external sources of knowledge and between private–private and public–private cooperation arrangements. The empirical model is based on the Fourth Community Inno...

This paper examines the determinants of wage pressure in large companies, including ownership characteristics and the impact of regional labour markets. By using a panel of 329 Polish largest firms during the period 19972001, we find evidence of rent sharing activities, however there is also asymmetry in quasi rent elasticity of wages. The wage setting mechanism seems to differ between new priv...

We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any commitment or costly actions. We exhibit ...

We investigate a competitive labor market with team production. Workers differ in their motivation to exert team effort, and types are private information. We show that there can exist a separating equilibrium in which workers self-select into different firms and firms employing cooperative workers make strictly positive profits. Profit differences across firms persist because cooperation stric...

There is little empirical evidence about risk management heterogeneity across firm types. I evaluate a policy that shifts oil price risk in highway procurement from the private sector to the government, reducing the cost of hedging to zero. In a tripledifferences design using data from Kansas and Iowa, I show that firms value hedging oil price risk between the auction and commencement of work. ...