This paper studies competitive allocations under adverse selection. We first provide a general necessary and sufficient condition for entry on an inactive market to be unprofitable. then use this result characterize, active market, unique budget-balanced allocation implemented by tariff making additional trades with entrant Motivated the recursive structure of allocation, we finally show that i...

Abstract We study a model in which agents with single-peaked preferences can participate costly voting procedure to determine the value of one-dimensional variable. show that, for all positive participation costs and profiles individual preferences, there exists unique equilibrium outcome one single participant whenever rule is strategy-proof, anonymous, responsive sense that reacts unanimous m...

We study the house allocation with existing tenants model (introduced by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez, 1999) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement for the underlying priority structure which is based on the acyclicity conditions by Ergin (2002) and Kesten (2006) for house allocation with quotas and without existing tenants. We show t...

Mechanism design for facility location (or selection of alternatives in a metric space) has been studied for decades. While strategy-proof, efficient mechanisms exist for unconstrained, one-dimensional, single-facility problems, guarantees of strategy-proofness and efficiency often break when allowing: (a) multiple dimensions; (b) multiple facilities; or (c) constraints on the feasible placemen...

Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash (1950)’s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By adding a relative equity component to SSP, we …rst consider a stronger version of of it, the Strong Suppes...

We consider risk sharing problems with a single good and finite number of states. Agents have a common prior and their preferences are represented in the expected utility form and are risk averse. We study efficient and individually rational risk sharing rules satisfying strategy-proofness, the requirement that no one can ever be benefited by misrepresenting his preference. When aggregate certa...

In this paper, we study the strategy-proofness properties of the randomized Condorcet voting system (RCVS). Discovered at several occasions independently, the RCVS is arguably the natural extension of the Condorcet method to cases where a deterministic Condorcet winner does not exists. Indeed, it selects the always-existing and essentially unique Condorcet winner of lotteries over alternatives....

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest ...

We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality. Since domain is not connected, famous characterization of Vickrey rule in terms Holmström (1979)'s three properties cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on domain, still only

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting.In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice functionthat satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict mono-tonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofnessof a social choice function to the properties of Independence of IrrelevantAlte...