Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neur...

What sets human beings apart from animals? How does ‘‘mind’’ fit with soul? Different historical and contemporary views of the mind/soul are considered. A clinical case is used to argue that a strong dualistic position is not compatible with neuro-scientific evidence nor with the expectation of life after death found in the Abrahamic faiths. Reductive physicalism is a widely held view, but risk...

Humean compatibilists argue that determinism is compatible with leeway freedom. They refute one of the premises consequence argument we have no choice about laws nature, and they do this by arguing nature does not prevent us from doing otherwise necessity since are just regularities. One humean compatibilists, Bernald Berofsky, starts off his critique premise pointing out standard fails to deal...

The principle that causes always render their effects more likely is fundamental to the enterprise of reducing facts of causation to facts about (objective) chances. This reductionist enterprise faces famous difficulties in accommodating common-sense intuitions about causal processes, if it insists on cashing out causal processes in terms of streams of events in which every event that belongs t...

Like any other sensation, pain does not include criteria for verifying its credibility. To construe it by the language of physical science means to ignore many substantial constraints complicating knowledge pain. Such kind description model would be reductive and incomplete regarding full range sense impressions. Moreover, individual self-reports about someone’s sensations have base on noncontr...

We overview the existing philosophical accounts of group belief, including both aggregative (or reductionist) approaches reducing collective belief to individual beliefs and non-reductionist approaches ascribing beliefs to the group as a whole. We then provide a modal logic of group belief GL that follows a non-reductionist approach. We compare our group belief logic with the well-known logic o...