This paper reports on the results of an experiment testing whether the agents selfselect between a competitive payment scheme and a revenue-sharing scheme depending on their inequity aversion. Average efficiency should be increased when these payment schemes are endogenously chosen by agents. We show that the choice of the competition is negatively affected by disadvantageous inequity aversion ...

Spectrum auction is an effective way to improve spectrum efficiency in cognitive networks. All traditional auction framework such as VCG price auction framework and second price auction framework face security risks. Collusion is the most important risk in multi-user cognitive networks. In this paper, we propose a security mechanism for the multi-user cognitive spectrum auction networks. This s...

We study auctions in which bidders have severe constraints on the size of messages they are allowed to send to the auctioneer. In such auctions, each bidder has a set of k possible bids (i.e. he can send up to t = log(k) bits to the mechanism). This paper studies the loss of economic efficiency and revenue in such mechanisms, compared with the case of unconstrained communication. For any number...

We consider a model in which production of a downstream good requires access to an excludable upstream resource owned by a vertically integrated firm. The quality of the resource depends on an investment made by the owner and impacts the demand curve in the downstream market. Under open access, the owner must share the resource with downstream competitors at a regulated tariff, determined after...

This paper examines a revenue neutral green tax reform along the lines of the Double Dividend hypothesis. Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy, we find that increasing gasoline taxes and using the revenue to reduce capital income taxes does indeed deliver both types of welfare gains: from higher consumption of market goods ( an efficiency dividend), and from a ...

We examine the problem of designing a strategy-proof auction in an online setting. This means that agents can arrive and depart dynamically. Thus, the auction mechanism must be able to decide on the optimal allocation of goods based only on bid information from the agents that have already arrived and not on future arrivals. If a good is to be allocated to an agent, the mechanism must do so bef...

We study the tradeoff between efficiency and service quality in tandem systems. We reward efficiency by assuming that a revenue is earned each time a job is completed, and we penalize poor service quality by incorporating positive holding costs. We study the dynamic assignment of servers to tasks with the objective of maximizing the long-run average profit. For systems of arbitrary size, genera...

This paper discusses how the effects of taxes on economic behavior are important for revenue estimation, for calculating efficiency effects, and for understanding short-term macroeconomoic consequences. The primary focus is on taxes on labor income but some attention is given to taxes on income from saving. Specific calculations illustrate the importance of behavioral responses for accurate cal...

Governments are in the early stages of providing constituents with information and services online over the Internet. E-government service decisions should be rooted in solid finance principles, such as efficiency, equity and revenue adequacy. Pricing decisions should be tailored to meet the demands of particular constituent groups and the revenue needs of government. By so doing, governments c...

The Internet is heading towards efficiency with the continued deployment of technologies such as Content Distribution Networks (CDN) and with the introduction of Peer-toPeer (P2P) localization. These technologies reduce the amount of costly traffic that Internet Service Providers (ISPs) must send to other ISPs. While these advances will undoubtedly cause many residential ISPs to gain profit, th...