It is standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. Yet it may be useful to consider social preferences in mechanism design and contract theory. We devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal offers one of three possible contract menus to a team o...

This work focuses on the B2B interaction between a service requester and a service provider in a healthcare environment. The requester is the primary caregiver responsible for managing the health of a population of patients. When a patient requires advanced care outside the requester’s expertise, the requester refers the patient to a provider and pays for the referral services. Treatment may su...

Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information about “norms of behavior”. Compared to a settin...

interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Abstract Neoclassical economics maintains that a legal system is required to foster anonymous exchange and hence efficiency. In contrast, social scientists from other disciplines emphas...

Online educational offerings are becoming increasingly commonplace. At the same time, relatively little is understood about the factors contributing to students’ participation in computer-mediated communication (CMC) in such environments, which ultimately affects student satisfaction with the online learning experience. In this paper, I propose a model that examines the relationship between an ...