In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

In order to address inefficiencies of Nash equilibria for horizontal queuing congestion networks, we study the Stackelberg routing game on parallel networks: assuming a coordinator has control over a fraction of the flow, what is a good way of routing that compliant flow so that the induced Nash equilibrium is closer to the social optimum than the initial Nash equilibrium? We study Stackelberg ...

The continuous network design problem (CNDP) is known to be difficult to solve due to the property of non-convexity and nonlinearity. Such kind of CNDP can be formulated as a bi-level programme, which may be classified into Stackelberg approach and Nash one according to the relationship between the upper level and the lower level parts. This paper formulates the CNDP for road expansion based on...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

• We introduce a multistage Stackelberg game for inspections with multiple targets. propose two solutions methods, using backward induction and linear programming. provide an explicit solution inspection where one inspector has the role of monitoring group inspectees. The resources to visit only few them. Visits are performed sequentially no repetitions. inspectees report share sequence as they...

The fastest known algorithm for solving General Bayesian Stackelberg games with a finite set of follower (adversary) types have seen direct practical use at the LAX airport for over 3 years; and currently, an (albeit non-Bayesian) algorithm for solving these games is also being used for scheduling air marshals on limited sectors of international flights by the US Federal Air Marshals Service. T...

To dissuade reckless driving and mitigate accidents, cities deploy resources to patrol roads. In this paper, we present STREETS, an application developed for the city of Singapore, which models the problem of computing randomized traffic patrol strategies as a defenderattacker Stackelberg game. Previous work on Stackelberg security games has focused extensively on counterterrorism settings. STR...

Stackelberg-like games show a situation where there is a clear advantage in moving …rst. In a thought provoking article, Bagwell (1995) shows that this advantage may not be robust against imperfect observations of the …rst move. We explore these ideas in the context of forward induction in three classic games, namely, the outside option game, the game of burning a dollar before the battle of th...