This paper analyzes how a firm’s returns and the stake of the controlling blockholders are affected when a bank becomes a blockholder with one of the largest stakes. Compared to previous studies, we approach this issue by taking into consideration the type of blockholders building up coalitions with banks in order to control a firm. This allows us to reconcile different results, reported in rel...

We found that decayed wood stakes with no termite damage collected from a termite-infested field exhibited a deterrent effect against the termite Reticulitermes speratus, Kolbe, 1885. The effect was observed to be lost or reduced by drying. After identification, it was found that the decayed stakes were infected by brown rot fungus Fibroporia radiculosa (Peck) Parmasto, 1968. In a no-choice fee...

• Technology obsolescence • Very large quantities of digital information that may be worth preserving for reuse • Heterogeneous and complex digital resources • Lack of scalable methods for preservation • Economic models What is at stake? What is at stake? • Investments in conversion of information to digital form • Preservation of an increasing share of information that is " born-digital " • Ab...

If short sellers can destroy firm value by manipulating prices down in a “bear raid,” an informed blockholder has a powerful natural incentive to protect the value of his stake by trading against them. However, he also has an incentive to use his information to generate trading profits. We show that these conflicting objectives create a multiplier effect, whereby the buying quantity needed to d...

If managers, creditors, or other firm counterparties use stock prices when making decisions, short sellers may attempt to manipulate prices, inducing decisions that reduce firm value. However, an informed long-term shareholder has a natural incentive to ensure that prices send the right message so that the value of his existing stake is not harmed. While he can achieve that by buying enough sha...

We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model u...