In the paper, we present a cross-layer perspective on data transmission in energy harvesting cognitive radio networks (CRNs). The physical layer power allocation and network layer delay are jointly considered. The delay optimal power allocation is studied taking account the randomness of harvested energy, data generation, channel state and the grid price. To guarantee PU’s transmission, its Sig...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

In order to address inefficiencies of Nash equilibria for horizontal queuing congestion networks, we study the Stackelberg routing game on parallel networks: assuming a coordinator has control over a fraction of the flow, what is a good way of routing that compliant flow so that the induced Nash equilibrium is closer to the social optimum than the initial Nash equilibrium? We study Stackelberg ...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of a mixed equilibrium. We compare the predictions in various classes of evolutionary and learning proc...

• We introduce a multistage Stackelberg game for inspections with multiple targets. propose two solutions methods, using backward induction and linear programming. provide an explicit solution inspection where one inspector has the role of monitoring group inspectees. The resources to visit only few them. Visits are performed sequentially no repetitions. inspectees report share sequence as they...

This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game asymmetric noisy observation. In our model, the follower cannot observe state process directly, but could observation process, while leader can completely process. Open-loop equilibrium considered. The first solve optimal control problem partial observation, maximum principle and verification theorem are obtained. Then turn...

Firstly, this paper develop a basic two-echelon DCSC model as the comparative benchmark in the general case of the stochastic demand effected by the service level of the retailer, where the manufacturer's optimal direct price, wholesale price and the retailer's optimal retail price were achieved under Stackelberg game. Then, through incorporate the fairness preference and risk-aversion characte...

The fastest known algorithm for solving General Bayesian Stackelberg games with a finite set of follower (adversary) types have seen direct practical use at the LAX airport for over 3 years; and currently, an (albeit non-Bayesian) algorithm for solving these games is also being used for scheduling air marshals on limited sectors of international flights by the US Federal Air Marshals Service. T...