This paper examines the convergence of payoffs and strategies in Erev and Roth’s model of reinforcement learning.When all players use this rule it eliminates iteratively dominated strategies and in two-person constant-sum games average payoffs converge to the value of the game. Strategies converge in constant-sum games with unique equilibria if they are pure or if they are mixed and the game is...

1. Introduction. Two person zero-sum differential games can be considered as control problems with two opposing controllers or players. One player seeks to maximize and one to minimize the pay-off function. The greatest pay-off that the maximizing player can force is termed the lower value of the game and similarly the least value which the minimizing player can force is called the upper value....

Consider a market in which firms accumulate capital according to the Nerlove-Arrow capital accumulation equation. Each player chooses a path of investment and thus an induced path of capital to maximize his total discounted profits which depend on his own capital and the capital stocks of his rivals. Existence is proved for such a nonzero sum, infinite horizon differential game and conditions u...

The Nash equilibria of a two-person, non-zero-sum game are the solutions of a certain linear complementarity problem (LCP). In order to use this for solving a game in extensive form, the game must first be converted to a strategic description such as the normal form. The classical normal form, however, is often exponentially large in the size of the game tree. If the game has perfect recall, a ...

The world oil market is modelled as a two-person non-zero-sum game in normal form with each player having a continuum of strategies. The two players are the oil importing nations (OPIC) and the oil exporting nations (OPEC). The game is solved in the noncooperative sense using the equilibrium point solution concept due to Nash. The Nash equilibrium point solution yields an analytic expression fo...

Kalmar [2, 1928-9] proved that Chess is strictly determined. Von Neumann-Morgenstern [5, 1944] proved the same for any finite two-person zero-sum perfect-information (PI) game. The latter result yields a minimax theorem for (finite) non-zero-sum PI games. Fix a PI, and a player, Ann. Convert this game to a two-person zero-sum game between Ann and the other players (considered as one player), in...

In this paper a two-person red-and-black game is investigated. We suppose that, at every stage of the game, player I’s win probability, f , is a function of the ratio of his bet to the sum of both players’ bets. Two results are given: (i) if f is convex then a bold strategy is optimal for player I when player II plays timidly; and (ii) if f satisfies f (s)f (t) ≤ f (st) then a timid strategy is...

We investigate the problem of learning to play the game of rock-paper-scissors. Each player attempts to improve her/his average score by adjusting the frequency of the three possible responses, using reinforcement learning. For the zero sum game the learning process displays Hamiltonian chaos. Thus, the learning trajectory can be simple or complex, depending on initial conditions. We also inves...

In this paper we study a two person zero sum stochastic differential game in weak formulation. Unlike the standard literature, which uses strategy type controls, the weak formulation allows us to consider the game with control against control. We shall prove the existence of game value under natural conditions. Another main feature of the paper is that we allow for non-Markovian structure, and ...

TheMultipleAttribute DecisionMaking (MADM) problem deals with candidate priority alternatives with respect to various attributes. MADM techniques are popularly used in diverse fields such as engineering, economics, management science, transportation planning, etc. Several approaches have been developed for assessing theweights of MADM problems, e.g., the eigenvector method, ELECTRE, TOPSIS, etc...