This paper develops a unified approach to study participation and voting in multiple elections. The theoretical setting combines an “uncertain-voter” model of turnout with a spatial model of voting behavior. We apply our framework to the study of turnout and voting in U.S. presidential and congressional elections. We structurally estimate the model using individual-level data for the 2000 elect...

Recent studies of political behavior suggest that voting decisions can be influenced substantially by "first-impression" social attributions based on physical appearance. Separate lines of research have implicated the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in the judgment of social traits on the one hand and economic decision-making on the other, making this region a plausible candidate for linking social ...

An important research topic in the field of computational social choice is the complexity of various forms of dishonest behavior, such as manipulation, control, and bribery. While much of the work on this topic assumes that the cheating party has full information about the election, recently there have been a number of attempts to gauge the complexity of non-truthful behavior under uncertainty ...

We study the cohesion within and the coalitions between political groups in the Eighth European Parliament (2014-2019) by analyzing two entirely different aspects of the behavior of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the policy-making processes. On one hand, we analyze their co-voting patterns and, on the other, their retweeting behavior. We make use of two diverse datasets in the...

This paper is a study in the theory of committees and elections. By a committee we will mean any group of people who arrive at a decision by means of voting. By a voting scheme I we will mean any method by which individual voting decisions are aggregated into committee decisions. Given various voting schemes we shall examine three techniques by which members may seek to manipulate committee dec...

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal...

We consider a set of voters making collective decision via simultaneous vote on two binary issues. Voters’ preferences are captured by payoffs assigned to combinations outcomes for each issue and they can be nonseparable: voter’s preference over an might dependent the other issue. When in this context is reached voting both issues at same time, multiple election paradoxes may arise, as studied ...