Article history: Received 26 January 2014 Received in revised form 17 March 2015 Accepted 3 May 2015 Available online 9 June 2015 The increasing competition in knowledge-intensive economy has made it even more important for technological companies to understand what determines employee creativity since it is a major source for corporate innovation. Research has indicated that individual attribu...

BACKGROUND Attempts to identify particular aspects of psychosocial work conditions as predictors of sickness absence remain inconclusive. A global measure has previously been suggested to be an efficient way to measure psychosocial work conditions in questionnaires. This paper investigates whether satisfaction with specific aspects of psychosocial work conditions explains sickness absence beyon...

Government procurement contracts generally garner a small number of bids, and it is not uncommon for only one bid to be considered. This paper quantifies multiple factors determining the extent of competition observed in the United States federal procurement data for commercially unavailable IT and telecommunications service contracts. We develop, identify, and estimate a principal-agent model ...

* We are grateful to Ulf Schiller for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We also thank Yanruo Wang for excellent research assistance. Agency theory has for most part focused on the nature and efficiency properties of " complete " incentive contracts. Accordingly, a contract is viewed as a collection of " if-then " statements such that a specific payoff results if a particular...

This paper describes the construction of two scales to measure police attitudes towards the selective enforcement of the law. The Service-Legalistic (S-L) scale measures police discretion along a flexible-inflexible continuum. Service-oriented police advocate the use of discretion to help solve social problems; legalistic police oppose discretion because it interferes with their duty to enforce...

We examine the role of discretion in executive incentive contracts, and explore the trade-offs firms face in choosing among imperfect objective measures of individual performance, more-accurate but non-verifiable subjective measures, and overly broad objective measures of company-wide performance that includes the performance of all agents in the firm. We generate implications and test the mode...