This paper studies equilibria of second price auctions when valuations and participation costs are both private information with general distribution functions. We consider the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in this general framework of two-dimensional types. It is shown that there always exists an equilibrium, and further there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium when all bidders ar...

A stable market structure is a partition of the firms in an industry such that there is no incentive for any breakups or mergers. Characterizing such stability requires an endogenization of both the core and Cournot equilibrium as well as all hybrid equilibria. This paper solves for the stable partitions in a general oligopoly by providing a tractable condition: a partition is stable if and onl...

Under study are games in which players receive private signals and then simultaneously choose actions from compact sets. Payoffs are measurable in signals and jointly continuous in actions. Stinchcombe (2011) [19] proves the existence of correlated equilibria for this class of games. This paper is a study of the information structures for these games, the discontinuous expected utility function...

This paper analyzes the stability of the exchange rate in an economy with noise traders. Noise trading is restricted to agents investing in the domestic stock market. The agents pricing foreign exchange hold rational expectations. Monetary policy is affected by the behavior of investors in the domestic stock market and in turn affects fundamental stock evaluations as well as noise trading. We s...

We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a “double stable” matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable c...

The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction between two or more players may depend on the weight they place on each other’s payoff. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. Paradoxically, the real, material payoff in equilibrium for a group of altruists may be lower than for selfish or spiteful groups. However, this can only be...

Based on the recursive preference approach, the dynamic and global properties of the two-country open economy are examined with one good and inputs of labor and capital, with capital being freely traded internationally. First by showing that the world’s consumption increases (resp. decreases) with an increase (resp. decrease) in the world’s capital, the global stability of the economy is obtain...

In this paper we address the question of deterministic cycles in a Ramsey model with heterogeneous in nite-lived agents and borrowing constraints, augmented to take into account the case of elastic labor supply. Under usual restrictions, not only we show that the steady state is unique, but also we clarify its stability properties through a local analysis. We nd that, in many cases, the introdu...

The issue of poverty traps is assessed using quantile regression. For that an augmentation of the usual convergence regressions by quadratic and cubic terms is used with emphasis on curve fitting rather than parameter estimation. The results show that the generic mechanism leading to poverty traps predominantly applies to countries with relatively low levels of income per capita or per worker t...

Generic extensive form games of perfect information have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Nöldeke and Samuelson (1993) show that in a stochastic evolutionary model also non-subgame perfect equilibriumstrategies may well survive in the long run. In a different model of evolution in the agent normal form of generic extensive form games of perfect information Hart (2002) shows that under suit...