Public communication is secure if a hostile third party cannot detect the informational content of the messages exchanged by the communicating parties. In Nash equilibrium, communication by computationally unbounded players cannot be secure. We assume complexity averse players, and show that a simple, secure and costless communication protocol becomes available as the marginal complexity cost t...

I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. JEL Classification Numbers: A14, C71, C72

This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full commitment fuels suspicion and increases potential losses for partners. JEL classification: C72, D01, D80 Corresponding Author: Amnon Levy, Economics Discipline, School of Economics and Information Systems, University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. Tel: 61-2-42213658 Fax: 61-2-4221...

This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared with the help of some illustrative examples. JEL Classification:C71, C72, C78, D71, D72, D78

We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. JEL-classification code: C72, C91

We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Cl...

This paper analyzes the impact of three termination rules for repeatedgame experiments. We compare treatments with a known finite end, an unknown end and two variants with a random termination rule. The termination rules do not significantly effect cooperation rates. JEL classification numbers: C72, C92, D21, D43

We study behavior in experimental beauty contests with, first, boundary and interior equilibria, and, second, homogeneous and heterogenous types of players. We find quicker and better convergence to the game-theoretic equilibrium with interior equilibria and homogeneous players. JEL-classification code: C72, C91

In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters for the determination of the outcome. We show that a subset of strategic voters partially counteracts the votes of the ideological voters. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D72.

We examine gender differences in trust in another party’s cooperation (CC) or its ability (AC). While men and women do not differ concerning trust in cooperation, gender has a strong influence when trust in another subject’s ability is required. JEL-classification: C72, C91