Deregulation and the relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk-taking The deregulation of the banking industry during the 1990s provides a natural (public policy) experiment for investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation contracts as the environment in which they operate becomes relatively more competitive. Using the Riegle-Neal Act of 1994 as a focal point, we invest...

*The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. Recently, there has been strong public outrage against current pay practices for corporate CEOs, regardver the past few years, there has been strong public outrage against current pay practices for corporate CEOs. To deal with th...

This paper examines whether links between inside and outside directors have an impact on CEO compensation. Using a comprehensive sample of 22,074 directors for 3,114 firms, we develop a measure of the " back door " distance between each pair of directors on a company's board. Specifically, using the entire network of directors and firms, we compute the minimum number of other company boards tha...

We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and...

This paper examines the determinants of executive compensation in Chinese banking during 2005–2012. Using the fixed effects panel, 2SLS and dynamic GMM regressions, I find that there is no significant positive pay performance relation, and CEO power does not necessarily exhibit higher levels of executive compensation. However, I show that ownership structure (measured by ownership concentration...

In this study we propose that norms of fairness are salient to top decision makers and show that overor underpayment of the CEO cascades down to lower organizational levels. Moreover, it appears that CEOs use their own power not only to increase their own salaries, but also those of their subordinates. One implication of such a process may be that the overpayment of a top executive has higher c...

The purpose of this study is to integrate the findings of the studies related to the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance in Asian countries. The second concern of the paper is to explore the moderating role of country-specific characteristics on the pay-performance relationship in Asian markets. In order to achieve the study’s objective, meta-analysis technique is utilize...