In social dilemmas punishment costs resources, not just from the one who is punished but often also from the punisher and society. Reciprocity on the other side is known to lead to cooperation without the costs of punishment. The questions at hand are whether punishment brings advantages besides its costs, and how its negative side-effects can be reduced to a minimum in an environment populated...

Theoretical and experimental research underscores the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation between humans. Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and that withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has b...

Cooperation, where one individual incurs a cost to help another, is a fundamental building block of the natural world and human society. It has been suggested that costly punishment can promote the evolution of cooperation, with the threat of punishment deterring free-riders. Recent experiments, however, have revealed the existence of 'antisocial' punishment, where non-cooperators punish cooper...

if in multiple offences deserving legal punishment (ḥadd) the perpetrated offences are similar, the punishments interfere and the person is sentenced to one legal punishment. this judgment is disputable from two perspectives. firstly, it is against the principle of non-interference of causes and effects. secondly, it is against the principle of justice and causes disturbance in public security ...

insulting to prophet or imam is obscene, shameful and insupportable for any muslim, so the person who insults must be killed. any where that there is no islamic government or it has not been ordained any rule about killing insulter; killing insulter has no retaliation (punishment). but when legislator especially issued a rule for killing punishment in article513 for the crime of insulting to pr...

Punishing defectors is an important means of stabilizing cooperation. When levels of cooperation and punishment are continuous, individuals must employ suitable social standards for defining defectors and for determining punishment levels. Here we investigate the evolution of a social reaction norm, or psychological response function, for determining the punishment level meted out by individual...

We run several experiments which allow us to compare cooperation under perfect and imperfect information in a centralized and decentralized punishment regime. Under perfect and extremely noisy information, aggregate behavior does not differ between institutions. Under intermediate noise, punishment escalates in the decentralized peer-to-peer punishment regime which badly affects efficiency whil...

Cognitive control theories predict enhanced conflict adaptation after punishment. However, no such effect was found in previous work. In the present study, we demonstrate in a flanker task how behavioural adjustments following punishment signals are highly dependent on punishment sensitivity (as measured by the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) scale): Whereas low punishment-sensitive partici...