We study stochastic linear programming games: a class of stochastic cooperative games whose payoffs under any realization of uncertainty are determined by a specially structured linear program. These games can model a variety of settings, including inventory centralization and cooperative network fortification. We focus on the core of these games under an allocation scheme that determines how p...

In this paper some relations between finite geometric spaces and cooperative games are considered. In particular by some recent results on blocking sets we have new results on blocking coalitions. Finally we introduce a new research field on the possible relations between quasihypergroups and cooperative games.

Forming effective coalitions is a major research challenge in AI and multi-agent systems. Thus, cooperative games, including Coalition Structure Generation (CSG), have been attracting considerable attention from the AI research community. Traditionally, the input of a cooperative game is a black-box function called a characteristic function. Therefore, many problems in cooperative games, includ...

This survey paper examines the problem of achieving global cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Contributions to this problem are reviewed from non-cooperative game theory, cooperative game theory, and implementation theory. Solutions to games where players have a continuous choice about how much to pollute, games where players make decisions about treaty participation, and games whe...

We study cooperative games with supermodular costs. We show that supermodular costs arise in a variety of situations; in particular, we show that the problem of minimizing a linear function over a supermodular polyhedron—a problem that often arises in combinatorial optimization—has supermodular optimal costs. In addition, we examine the computational complexity of the least core and least core ...

My primary research interest is social behavior for software agents to achieve cooperation in general-sum normal form games. An agent can easily be programmed to constantly cooperate in a normal form game, but such an agent is not suitable for environments with potentially hostile opponents. For a rational agent, the main reason to cooperate is to induce reciprocation therefore it is necessary ...

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. In many such allocation problems there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we consider a class of games with a permission structure describing situations in which players in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that nee...

In this paper we embed the theory of cooperative differential games within the theory of dynamic games and discuss a number of results of them.

The aim of this paper is to compute Shapley’s and Banzhaf’s values of cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure. There have been previous models developed to study the problem of games with partial cooperation. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and Owen. Another type of combinatorial structure introduced by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink is equ...